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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyse for a multi-country large emerging market sample the choice between debt and eq- 
uity simultaneously with the decision between short- and long-term debts. In order to investigate the joint decision 
among leverage and maturity, we examine an unique sample of 986 firms and 13,490 firm-year observations from Latin 
America and 686 firms and 7919 firm-year observations from Eastern Europe for the period 1990-2003. We employ 
dynamic panel data analysis using Generalized Method of moments. The empirical results support three main findings. 
First, the cross-effects between leverage and maturity behave exactly the opposite between Latin America and Eastern 
Europe sub-samples. Capital structure and debt maturity are policy complements in Latin America and substitutes in 
Eastern Europe. Second, there is a significant dynamic effects component in the determination of leverage and maturity. 
Finally, adjustment to the target maturity is by no means costless and instantaneous with firm facing moderate adjust- 
ment costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the empirical research on capital structure has 
focused on a single decision at a time, that is, each fin- 
ancial decision is taken as independent of the other deci- 
sions. It may be the case that most of these decisions are 
not independent but actually complements or substitutes 
among each other. If that is the case, a further investiga- 
tion should be undertaken whether there is interdepend- 
ence among them or not. 
In this paper, we investigate the choice between debt 
and equity simultaneously with the decision between 
short-and long-term debt for a large sample of emerging 
markets from Latin America and Eastern Europe. In or- 
der to investigate the joint decision among leverage and 
maturity, we examine an unique sample of 986 firms and 
13,490 firm-year observations from Latin America and 
686 firms and 7919 firm-year observations from Eastern 
Europe for the period 1990-2003. These two regions are 
ideal for our purposes because they contain a larger num- 
ber of countries that have gone through extensive priva- 
tization during the time period analysed but still in dif- 
ferent stages in the transition to capitalism systems and 
markets development. In fact, Latin America has experi-
enced hyperinflation and economic instability over the 
1980s and profound economic reforms in the 1990s, and 
Eastern Europe has made the transition from centralized 
to market economies during the 1990s as well. 
This paper has several objectives: First, we examine 
whether in an emerging countries context, the theory of 
joint capital structure and debt maturity determination, 
attempts to understand country and regions specific dif- 
ferences. Second, we test whether there is a substantial 
dynamic component in the determination of the endoge- 
nous variables. Third, we analyse whether there are dif- 
ferences in the adjustment costs towards optimal capital 
structure and debt maturity. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 is dedicated 
to the literature review. Section 3 presents the data sources 
and discusses sample selection, macro and firm-level fin- 
ancial information. In Section 4, the model and specifica- 
tion tests are presented. Results are presented in Section 
5; Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background on Capital Structure and 
Debt Maturity 
Theories in capital structure and debt maturity as well as 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                 JMF 
C. MATEUS, P. TERRA 47
subsequent empirical work mainly focused in a single 
decision at a time. The main theories of capital structure 
can be classified into three groups: tax based, agency 
cost and asymmetric information theories. Trade-off the- 
ory argues that firms establish a debt target and strive to 
reach it through time. In the theoretical framework firms 
pursue an optimal capital structure determined by a trade- 
off between the tax benefits of increasing debt financing 
(interest tax shield) and bankruptcy costs that arise from 
higher debt levels. As imperfections such taxes (corpo- 
rate and personal), a variable interest rate, credit con- 
straints, and bankruptcy costs are introduced in the model, 
the trade-off results (i.e. [1-3]). 
A second group of the literature encompasses all those 
explanations that are based on imperfect information as- 
sumptions. In his seminal paper [4], argues that the value 
of the firm depends on its assets in place (whose value do 
not depend on future investment) as well as growth op- 
portunities (whose value depends on future investment 
strategy). The implication is that this real option charac-
teristic of the firm induces a transfer of wealth between 
shareholders and bondholders that may prevent the firm 
to undertake positive NPV projects (the debt overhand- 
or underinvestment problem). [5] realizes that managers 
have privileged information regarding both tangible (as- 
sets in place) and intangible (growth opportunities) assets 
and investors are aware of this fact. In light of such im- 
perfect information there may be wealth transfers be- 
tween old and new shareholders when the firm decides to 
issue new securities. This information asymmetry affects 
the firm’s financing-investment decision in a way that 
causes managers to pass up valuable investment oppor- 
tunities in order to preserve (old) shareholders’ interests: 
the underinvestment problem. Other stream of literature 
suggests the agency theory framework to study the opti- 
mal leverage ratio [6,7]. In their perspective, too little 
debt can lead to an overinvestment problem, as managers 
seek to sustain growth at the expense of profitability. 
Theoretical arguments for the choice of corporate debt 
maturity can be divided in trade-off considerations and, 
asymmetric information problems as well. Arguments 
based on trade-off considerations rely on the proposition 
that the optimal maturity of debt is determined by the 
trade-off between the costs of rollover short-term debt 
vis-à-vis the usually higher interest rate bore by long- 
term debt. In many senses the arguments rely on explicit 
transaction costs of different kinds of debt such as flota- 
tion and rollover costs as well as tax-shield benefits and 
implicit bankruptcy costs. The tax-based explanation sug- 
gested by [8,9] are perhaps the best known examples. 
Other hypothesis derives from asymmetric information. 
In this case, the maturity structure is yet another instru- 
ment that firms can use in order to solve the agency 
problems faced by the various stakeholders of the firm. 
These agency approaches suggest that firms choose the 
optimal debt maturity in order to solve information asym- 
metry that gives rise to the underinvestment and/or over- 
investment problems. 
Most of the existing literature on capital structure comes 
from single country analysis. These studies use primarily 
large listed firms as in [10], for the United States, [11-13] 
for the United Kingdom, [14] for Spain and [15] for Por- 
tugal. A few studies focus on international samples ([16- 
20]) and more recently [21-23]. However, all of these 
studies focus on large listed firms. In [16] the sample was 
from large listed firms for the G7 countries. They found 
that the determinants of capital structure in the United 
States are the same for the other countries. They also find 
that debt levels do not differ among bank-oriented coun- 
tries and market-oriented ones. [17] finds for a sample of 
G5 countries that the mean leverage among countries 
appears to be similar. However, he highlights that some 
of the differences can occur because of the differences in 
tax policies, agency problems, and information asymme- 
tries and shareholder/creditors conflicts. [18] finds for 10 
developing countries that capital structure choices are 
affected by the same variables as in developed countries. 
[19], using the same sample as [16] but with more recent 
data found that the overall leverage in 2001 is lower than 
in 1991 and the determinants of capital structure is the 
United States lose some of the explanatory power over- 
seas. [20] using a sample of listed firms provided evi- 
dence that neither the trade-off nor pecking order model 
offer a suitable description of the capital structure poli- 
cies in Europe. They also document that the notional 
environment do matter for capital structure decisions. [21] 
uses a large sample of listed firms for 42 countries equally 
divided between developed and developing countries cov- 
ering the years from 1997 to 2001. They stated that coun- 
try-specific factors do matter in determining and affect- 
ing the leverage choice around the countries analysed. 
[22] analyses how firms operating in capital market-ori- 
ented economies (United States and United Kingdom) 
and bank-oriented economies (France, Germany and Japan) 
determine their capital structure. They find that leverage 
is affected by the market conditions in which the firm 
operates and overall the capital structure of a firm is hea- 
vily influenced by corporate governance, tax systems and 
the level of investor protection. Finally [23], using a sam- 
ple of 39 developed and developing countries for the per- 
iod 1991 to 2006 suggest that a firm’s capital structure is 
determined more by the country in which it is located 
than by its industry affiliation. They find as well that 
country’s legal and tax systems, level of corruption ex- 
plain a significant portion of the variation in leverage. 
Regarding debt maturity, most empirical studies have 
concentrated on the United States. [24,25] pioneer stud- 
ies have taken different empirical approaches to the prob- 
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lem. While [25] investigates the maturity structure of 
firm’s total indebtedness, [24] focuses on the maturity of 
single bond issues. These are the two most common em- 
pirical approaches in the literature. The first approach is 
followed by [26-32]. The second approach is preferred 
by [33-35] who also investigate bond issues finding evi- 
dence of market timing of bond issues. Few studies in- 
vestigate debt maturity in an international setting. [36] 
investigates the maturity structure of 604 and 750 non- 
financial firms from the United Kingdom and Italy, re- 
spectively. They find support for the hypothesis that firm 
chooses the maturity of their liabilities to match those in 
their assets. Their results are in line with those of [37,38] 
and find that debt maturity depends on both firm-specific 
and country-specific factors, opening the question of the 
degree of influence of each group of factors on the ma- 
turity structure. Larger sets of countries are studied by 
[39] who explored the hypothesis that the financial de- 
velopment of a country determines the maturity of its 
firms’ debt. They find support for the hypothesis that 
legal and institutional differences among countries ex- 
plain a large part of the leverage and debt maturity 
choices of firms. [23] also studies the subject for 11 in- 
dustries in 39 countries and their results largely support 
[39] findings.  
In a joint determination of capital structure and debt 
maturity perspective [40] build the argument that a firm 
chooses leverage and debt maturity to maximize its value 
given a set of exogenous firm characteristics. Their em- 
pirical results suggest that capital structure and debt ma- 
turity are substitutes in addressing financial problems. 
3. Data, Variables and Methodology 
3.1. Macro Financial Data 
This study focus in emerging markets countries that have 
gone through substantial changes in the past couple of 
decades. Two geographic distinguish groups are studied: 
Latin America, which has experienced hyperinflation and 
economic instability over the 1980s and profound eco- 
nomic reforms in the 1990s and, Eastern Europe that 
have made the transition from centralized to market eco- 
nomies about the same period of time. Both groups of 
countries have gone through extensive privatization as 
documented in [41,42] in the case of Latin America and 
[43,44] for Eastern Europe. 
In Table 1 is provided a country-level summary statis- 
tics on key economic indicators and financial indicators 
for these countries for the period 1990 to 20031. The 
countries sampled are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (henceforth called “Latin 
America 7” or simply “LA-7”) and Bulgaria, Czech Re-
public, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Rus- 
sian Federation (henceforth called “Eastern Europe 7” or 
simply “EE-7”). 
In both groups of countries is observed highly infla- 
tionary environments in the period 1990-2003, although 
the high average annual inflation is influenced by the 
hyper-inflationary early 1990s in some countries (e.g. Ar- 
gentina, Bulgaria, Brazil and Mexico). In addition, infla- 
tion has been more resilient in Romania and Russian 
Federation (henceforth simply “Russia”) during the same 
period. Due to this inflationary environment, countries in 
the sample display depressing growth, particularly in 
Eastern Europe. The average annualized growth rates are 
often negative for the EE-7, and generally below 3 per- 
cent in Latin America2. The economies in the sample are 
in general small, with three large outliers: Brazil, Mexico 
and Russia, which have GDPs above US$300 billion in 
constant US dollars (2000). In terms of financial structure, 
Latin American economies showed in general a more de- 
veloped stage than Eastern European ones. The EE-7 has 
a larger ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP than the LA-7 
that might be reflect of the higher inflation rate, since 
central bank assets are proportionally bigger in the LA-7. 
In both groups the credit to the private sector is similar, 
but EE-7 countries seem to be more bank-based than the 
LA-7 given the larger bank deposits to GDP and bank 
concentration. Interestingly, the net interest margin is 
higher for the LA-7 indicating a less competitive bank 
market. Private bond markets are equally incipient for 
both groups of countries, while public bond markets are 
at least three times larger. This might suggest that the 
government crowds out private issuers in such markets. 
Stock markets are greater in Latin America, in both ab- 
solute and relative terms, although Eastern European mar- 
kets are relatively more actively traded. In all other as- 
pects, Latin American stock markets seem more devel- 
oped: they trade a larger number of companies and those 
companies have larger market capitalization than their 
counterparts in the EE-7. This is not a surprise since 
stock markets in Latin America date from the beginning 
of the 20th century while in Eastern Europe such markets 
have just begun trading about two decades ago. 
In summary, these are economies that have a recent 
history of unstable economies, combining higher infla- 
tion with lower growth. These economies are predomi- 
nantly bank-based, although the LA-7 has comparatively 
more developed stock markets, and public bond markets 
are much larger than private ones moving towards mar- 
ket based more quickly than eastern European countries. 
3.2. Firm-Level Data and Variables 
The primary data sources are from the Economatica Pro  
2Chile has been an exception with a growth rate of more than 5 percent 
a year over the sample period. 
1These indicators are collected from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and World Bank’s Financial Structure Database. 
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Table 1. Macro financial data. The table presents key economic and financial indicators from the financial structure database 
(World Bank, 2005a) and World Development Indicators Online (World Bank, 2005b). The sample consists of yearly obser- 
vations for each country over the period 1990 to 2003 (unless indicated otherwise), depending on data availability. EE-7 re- 
fers to the simple average of country-level data for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the 
Russia, and “LA-7” refers to the simple average of country-level data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela. 
Panel (a) Latin America 
Country 
Variable Unit Period 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela LA-7 
Annual Inflation Rate Percentage 1990-2003Average 13.21 123.63 7.30 15.65 14.04 26.31 34.91 33.58 
Real GDP (constant 2000 US$) US$ Millions 2003 263,469 624,490 81,955 90,131 593,551 57,862 101,878 259,048
Real GDP growth Percentage 1990-2003Average 2.67 2.18 5.21 2.32 2.61 3.45 0.48 2.70 
GDP per capita US$ 2003 6957 3536 5196 2022 5803 2131 3968 4230 
GDP per capita growth Percentage 1990-2003Average 1.51 0.90 3.82 0.56 1.11 1.76 −1.38 1.18 
Deposit money bank vs  
central bank assets Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 83.99 73.16 76.64 92.66 93.65 98.47 70.07 84.09 
Liquid Liabilities (M3) to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 21.70 25.66 37.14 28.86 26.81 23.03 23.98 26.74 
Central bank assets to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 5.25 14.14 16.06 1.50 2.67 0.28 6.87 6.68 
Private credit by deposit  
money banks to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 18.03 25.80 49.76 16.83 20.99 16.62 11.06 22.73 
Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial  
institutions to GDP 
Percentage 1990-2003Average 18.39 31.53 60.29 26.82 21.70 17.34 14.36 27.20 
Bank deposits to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 17.60 22.65 33.38 16.60 23.59 18.66 17.55 21.43 
Bank Concentration  
(share of 3 largest banks  
in total deposits) 
Percentage 1990-2003Average 44.34 45.47 60.95 37.38 62.60 71.74 60.32 54.69 
Net Interest Margin Percentage 1990-2003Average 7.64 12.16 5.53 7.06 6.48 10.63 17.52 9.57 
Stock market capitalization to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 28.44 24.97 79.64 13.19 27.82 17.25 9.78 28.73 
Stock market total  
value traded to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 3.03 12.94 7.56 1.01 9.88 3.71 2.15 5.89 
Stock market turnover ratio Percentage 1990-2003Average 27.18 51.18 9.18 7.51 34.94 22.31 18.19 24.36 
Private bond market  
capitalization to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 3.90 9.93 15.52 0.47 2.14 2.49 NA 5.74 
Public bond market  
capitalization to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 8.42 30.15 27.85 10.13 12.32 1.63 NA 15.08 
Listed domestic companies, total Number 1990-2003Median 142 540 261 118 192 238 87 192 
Market capitalization  
of listed companies US$ Millions 
1990-2002
Average 65,636 149,069 52,354 11,254 119,715 9104 7766 59,271
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Panel (b) Eastern Europe 
Country 
Variable Unit Period 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Russia EE-7
Annual Inflation Rate Percentage 1990-2003Average 71.10 5.36 25.09 27.16 19.30 75.35 76.56 42.84
Real GDP (constant 2000 US$) US$ Millions 2003 14,380 60,186 9553 14,179 177,016 42,688 306,690 89,242
Real GDP growth Percentage 1990-2003Average −0.31 0.73 −0.62 −0.85 3.04 −0.32 −1.63 0.00
GDP per capita US$ 2003 1838 5899 4116 4105 4634 1963 2138 3528
GDP per capita growth Percentage 1990-2003Average 0.46 0.84 0.38 −037 3.30 0.14 −1.39 0.44
Deposit money bank vs central bank 
assets Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 80.10 96.68 93.54 99.81 89.39 91.38 71.55 88.92
Liquid Liabilities (M3) to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 46.08 65.70 26.09 21.33 34.47 21.81 NA 35.91
Central bank assets to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 8.50 2.01 1.29 0.03 3.76 1.70 NA 2.88
Private credit by deposit  
money banks to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 48.33 62.86 21.18 16.90 29.70 19.34 NA 33.05
Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial  
institutions to GDP 
Percentage 1990-2003Average 29.37 54.58 15.02 12.22 20.89 7.60 NA 23.28
Bank deposits to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 37.28 57.57 17.37 15.01 28.74 18.99 NA 29.16
Bank Concentration  
(share of 3 largest banks  
in total deposits) 
Percentage 1990-2003Average 60.58 76.72 55.35 89.09 55.30 76.44 38.98 64.64
Net Interest Margin Percentage 1990-2003Average 5.27 3.12 4.66 4.92 5.13 9.25 8.47 5.83
Stock market capitalization to GDP Percentage 1990-2003Average 3.14 20.61 5.69 9.99 8.91 3.17 15.94 9.64
Stock market total  
value traded to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average 0.40 8.59 1.39 1.42 3.98 0.60 5.47 3.12
Stock market turnover ratio Percentage 1990-2003Average 9.78 44.20 24.33 17.76 72.85 28.54 54.74 36.03
Private bond market  
capitalization to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average NA 4.17 NA NA NA NA NA 4.17
Public bond market  
capitalization to GDP Percentage 
1990-2003
Average NA 21.51 NA NA 27.98 NA 3.62 17.70
Listed domestic companies, total Number 1990-2003Median 355 213 62 54 143 93 196 143
Market capitalization  
of listed companies US$ Millions 
1990-2002
Average 453 12,488 404 1151 13,932 1052 42,803 10,326
 
database for the Latin America countries (Economatica 
2003) and from the 2004 version of Amadeus (Analyse 
major Database from European Sources) Database by 
Bureau Van Dijk for the Eastern European countries. We 
only considered listed firms, the level of analysis is each 
firm and observations are yearly during the period 1990- 
2002 for Latin America and 1994-2003 to Eastern Europe. 
The database contains 1242 unique firms for the LA-7 
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and 693 industrial firms for the EE-7 over the period 
covered. After excluding financial firms as well as firms 
with missing data for key variables (discussed later), the 
sample is reduced to 986 firms and 13,490 firm-year ob- 
servations from Latin America and 686 firms and 7,919 
firm-year observations from Eastern Europe3. Table 2 
presents the distribution of firms by country and region. 
The dependent variables in our study are proxies for 
leverage and maturity of debt and measured as long-term 
debt over book equity (i.e. the debt-equity-to-ratio “Lev- 
erage”) and long-tern financial debt over short-term loans 
plus long-term financial debt (i.e. “Maturity”)4. 
Table 3 panels (a) and (b) shows the summary statis- 
tics of Leverage and Maturityfor the LA-7 and EE-7 
countries, respectively. One can highlight that Brazil 
heavily influences the Latin America sample while the 
most influential countries in Eastern Europe are Poland, 
Russia and Bulgaria. On the other hand, Venezuela has 
little impact on the Latin America sample as well as Lat- 
via in the Eastern Europe group of firms. There is evi- 
dence of substantially higher maturity ratios for EE-7 
compared with LA-7 (0.59 and 0.48, respectively), being 
Mexico and Poland the countries with larger values in 
each sub-sample (0.54 and 0.76, respectively). In terms 
of Leverage, long term debt corresponds to 105 percent 
and 19 percent of equity to LA-7 and EE-7 countries, 
respectively. Brazil has the highest level of leverage for 
the whole 14 countries (170 percent) while Poland has 
the lowest level (8 percent). 
 
Table 2. Firms by country and region. The sample consists 
of 986 firms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mex- 
ico, Peru and Venezuela (Economatica Pro database, 2003) 
over the period 1990-2002 and 686 firms from Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Russia (Amadeus database, 2004) over the period 1994- 
2003. 
Latin America LA-7 Eastern Europe EE-7 
Argentina 76 Bulgaria 148 
Brazil 395 Czech Republic 48 
Chile 169 Latvia 21 
Colombia 47 Lithuania 27 
Mexico 145 Poland 146 
Peru 126 Romania 48 
Venezuela 28 Russia 134 
LA-7 986 EE-7 686 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics. The sample consists of 13,490 firm-year observations from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (Economatica Pro database, 2003) over the period 1990-2002 and 7919 firm-year observations 
from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia (Amadeus database, 2004) over the period 
1994-2003. Leverage is calculated as the book value of long-term debt over book value of equity. Maturity is the book value of 
long-term financial debt over book value of short-term loans plus book value of long-term financial debt. “LA-7” refers to the 
pooling together of all firm-level data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, while “EE-7” 
refers to the pooling of firm level data for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. 
Panel (a) Dependent Variables: Latin America 
 Leverage  Maturity 
Countries Observations Mean Std. Dev. Countries Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Argentina 614 0.9552 6.7349 Argentina 538 0.4184 0.3283 
Brazil 3270 1.6999 15.1451 Brazil 2850 0.4645 0.3078 
Chile 1742 0.3266 0.6098 Chile 1518 0.4997 0.3540 
Colombia 280 0.4687 1.7781 Colombia 241 0.4617 0.3410 
Mexico 1324 0.6869 1.2427 Mexico 1204 0.5431 0.3227 
Peru 1012 1.0447 19.5014 Peru 142 0.4012 0.3392 
Venezuela 175 0.2757 0.3367 Venezuela 146 0.4292 0.3112 
LA-7 8417 1.0527 11.7826 LA-7 6639 0.4808 0.3272 
Panel (b) Dependent Variables: Eastern Europe 
 Leverage  Maturity 
Countries Observations Mean Std. Dev. Countries Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Bulgaria 633 0.3324 1.0155 Bulgaria 540 0.5249 0.4283 
Czech Republic 417 0.1441 0.2046 Czech Republic 364 0.3684 0.3582 
Latvia 115 0.1465 0.2330 Latvia 87 0.4337 0.3559 
Lithuania 190 0.1902 0.2543 Lithuania 161 0.5181 0.3374 
Poland 755 0.0808 0.3462 Poland 234 0.7640 0.2964 
Romania 421 0.0945 0.4080 Romania 267 0.7116 0.3663 
Russia 655 0.2777 2.0953 Russia 603 0.6952 0.3692 
EE-7 3186 0.1903 1.0852 EE-7 2256 0.5881 0.3960 
 
3In order to reduce the survival bias, firms are allowed to leave and enter the dataset over time. The final sample is an unbalanced panel. 
4We choose book values instead of market values because the reliability of market based figures for emerging markets for the studied time period is 
questionable (in particular with respect to debt valuation), due secondary markets are thin, trade is often infrequent and data availability is difficult. 
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Firm-specific determinant factors for the debt maturity 
structure are chosen from those often suggested in the 
literature. The set of firm-specific variables consists of 
the following: size, growth opportunities, profitability, 
liquidity, tangibility, tax effects and business risk. In de- 
tail the variables are calculated as: 1) size is measured by 
the natural logarithm of sales; 2) growth opportunities of 
the firm are assessed by the market-to-book ratio for 
Latin America firms5 calculated as book value liabilities 
plus market capitalization over total book value assets; 
for Eastern Europe firms growth opportunities are meas- 
ure as the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed 
assets6; 3) profitability, a proxy for firm and credit qual- 
ity, is calculated according to the usual return-on-assets 
ratio by operating income over total book assets; 4) busi- 
ness risk is measured by the degree of operational lever- 
age and calculated as sales divided by operating income; 
5) the degree of liquidity as an indicator of cash con- 
straints is given by the current liquidity ratio and meas- 
ured as current assets over current liabilities; 6) the de- 
gree of tangibility of assets as an indicator of collateral 
value is given by the degree of asset immobilization and 
measured as net fixed assets over total book assets and 
finally; 7) the tax effects are measured by the effective 
average tax rate of the firm the ratio of total taxes charges 
divided by taxable earnings7. Additionally, we also de- 
fine a binary variable to control for regulated industries. 
This variable assumes the value of one if the firm’s main 
industrial activity belongs to one of the following Indus- 
tries: Contraction, Electricity, Gas and Oil, Mining, Tele- 
communications, Transport and Logistics. These Indus- 
tries are subject to closer government scrutiny even when 
pursued solely by private companies, and are submitted 
to stricter regulations than other industries. 
Table 4 panels (a) and (b) reports summary statistics 
for the independent variables of Latin America and East- 
ern European firms, respectively. We can highlight that 
LA-7 firms are larger, with more growth opportunities, 
are less profitable, have lower business risk and pay less 
taxes, on average. However, some variables have a larger  
dispersion around their average. That is the case for ex- 
ample for the business Risk proxy with a standard devia- 
tion of 218.00 and 507.45 for LA-7 and EE-7, respec- 
tively. Therefore, the average values should be analysed 
with some concerns suggesting the presence of large out- 
liers that may inflate the standard deviation for this vari- 
able and others8. 
In Table 5 (Panels (a) and (b)) it is presented the cor- 
relation matrix for the independent variables (firm’s char- 
acteristics). We can highlight that larger firms tend to be 
more profitable, with more growth opportunities, have 
less liquidity, are riskier and have more fixed assets as a 
proportion of total assets in the case of LA-7 and less so 
for the EE-7 countries9. 
Besides the above variables, we employ a set of dummy 
variables as instruments. First, the sector where each firm 
operates is included, given the possible systematic effects 
that the nature of the firm’s businesses may have over its 
leverage, in particular the total leverage measures. The 
different sectors10 are represented by a set of dummy 
variables based on their classification provided in the 
databases. The sector “Food and Beverages” is chosen as 
the base-case so that the instrument set may include an 
intercept. Similarly, country dummies are used to account 
for any country-specific variation such as the institutional 
framework, business environment, and macroeconomic 
conditions. For this situation “Brazil” is chosen as the 
base case for Latin America and “Bulgaria” for Eastern 
Europe. 
4. Model and Specification Tests 
4.1. The Empirical Model 
A panel data analysis is performed according to the fol-
lowing general (static) model: 
, 0, 0, 1, , , 2, , ,
1 1
Leverage
K L
i t i t k i k t l i l t i i t
k l
Y Z ,    
 
        
(Equation (1)) 
,
0, 0, 1, , , 2, , , ,
1 1
Maturity
Δ
i t
K L
i t k i k t l i l t i
k l
Y Z i t     
 
        5Nevertheless book values are chosen in this study, we use a market 
based variable in this case since stock markets in Latin America are 
much more liquid than debt markets. Therefore, the use of the mar-
ket-to-book ratio here seems reasonable. 
6The majority of Eastern European firms in our sample did not have 
stock market data available in the database used (Amadeus by Bureau 
Van Dijk) therefore we choose this variable with an alternative meas-
ure. 
7The more correct way to measure the effect of taxes on maturity struc-
ture would be calculating the Miller Tax Term, i.e. 
   
 
1 1
1
1
c e
i
T T
T
      
where,  and  are the stacked vec- ,Leveragei t ,Maturityi t
8In order to account for such cases in the Business Risk variable and 
others, in the data analyses that follows we take appropriate remedial 
measures. 
9Since the correlations are generally low in our sample, there are no 
multicollinearity problems among the independent variables. 
10Firms are classified in one of the following 19 sectors, according to 
their primary NAICS (Latin America) or NACE (Eastern Europe) 
codes: Agriculture, Chemical, Construction, Electricity, Electronic, 
Food and Beverages, Gas and Oil, Machinery, Manufacturing, Mining, 
Pulp and Paper, Retailing and Wholesaling, Services, Software, Steel, 
Telecommunications, Textile, Transport and Logistics, and Vehicles 
and Parts.
 , where Tc is the corporate tax rate, Ti is the 
personal tax rate and Te is the tax rate on equity income. However, 
obtaining reliable tax rates over several years for seven different coun-
tries can prove difficult. In this study, we choose the average effective 
tax rate as a substitute, following [18]. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for independent variables. (a) The sample consists of 13,490 firm-year observations from Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (Economatica Pro database, 2003) over the period 1990-2002. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total sales. Growth opportunities are equal to the book value of liabilities plus market capitalization 
over book value of total assets. Profitability is equal to operating income over book value of total assets. Business Risk is cal- 
culated as sales over operating income. Liquidity is book value of current assets over book value of current liabilities. Tangi- 
bility is defined as net fixed assets over book value of total assets. Tax Effects is equal to taxes over taxable earnings. “Latin 
America” refers to the pooling together of all firm-level data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela; (b) The sample consists of 7919 firm-year observations from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Russia (Amadeus database, 2004) over the period 1994-2003. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales. Growth 
Opportunities are the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets. Profitability is equal to operating income over book 
value of total assets. Business Risk is calculated as sales over operating income. Liquidity is book value of current assets over 
book value of current liabilities. Tangibility is defined as net fixed assets over book value of total assets. Tax Effects is equal to 
taxes over taxable earnings. “Eastern Europe” refers to the pooling together of all firm-level data from Bulgaria, Czech Re- 
public, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. 
Panel (a) Latin America 
Countries Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Size 582 11.3880 1.8235 2896 11.5804 1.8322 1580 10.2488 1.8960 297 11.0402 1.5650
Growth Opportunities 497 0.9887 0.4354 2813 0.8115 0.4786 1320 2.1829 8.6707 201 0.8253 0.4274
Profitability 614 0.3538 0.0711 3262 0.0308 0.8922 1748 0.0587 0.1025 287 0.0303 0.0781
Business Risk 594 0.8755 155.6350 3253 1.2234 155.8223 1633 12.7145 125.3976 286 31.1815 725.7262
Liquidity 614 1.6938 2.7358 3263 2.5267 22.5466 1738 5.0646 43.2245 281 1.6976 1.1712
Tangibility 597 0.4597 0.2619 3265 0.3578 0.2621 1719 0.4111 0.2879 274 0.2494 0.1894
Tax Effects 344 0.1399 1.0425 3260 0.4042 12.4357 1482 0.0295 0.8842 287 0.1107 1.5110
 
Countries Mexico Peru Venezuela Latin America 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Size 1335 12.2981 1.7981 1005 10.2201 1.2713 166 10.9196 1.8189 7861 11.2121 1.9207 
Growth Opportunities 873 1.2778 0.6577 633 1.1085 0.7247 140 0.7463 0.3507 6477 1.1955 3.9775 
Profitability 1339 0.0756 0.7630 1010 0.0597 0.1178 175 0.0346 0.0659 8435 0.0475 0.0938 
Business Risk 1339 16.8693 196.8102 1006 14.8608 267.0739 171 2.1902 51.4443 8282 8.7048 218.0081
Liquidity 1340 5.2687 99.4697 1012 2.0033 4.2355 175 2.1203 2.8290 8423 3.3263 46.4780
Tangibility 1340 0.5120 0.2716 1012 0.4771 0.2220 175 0.5355 0.2263 8382 0.4152 0.2705 
Tax Effects 1339 −4.1846 137.5319 1009 0.3121 3.9597 174 0.0971 1.5772 7895 −0.4851 57.2277
Panel (b) Eastern Europe 
Countries Bulgaria Czech Republic Latvia Lithuania 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Size 1434 6.8570 4.3720 480 16.0723 6.4678 206 9.1521 8.2399 270 11.7904 7.9011 
Growth Opportunities 633 0.1066 0.0622 417 0.0122 0.0200 115 0.0280 0.0640 190 0.0058 0.0107 
Profitability 633 0.0030 0.0223 417 0.0548 0.0790 115 1.3005 13.3508 190 0.0670 0.0911 
Business Risk 628 30.5194 122.325 402 12.6361 232.3752 115 18.3172 75.8044 187 11.2720 112.5914
Liquidity 633 2.2747 3.1276 417 1.9586 2.1405 114 5.3497 8.2373 188 2.7688 3.2459 
Tangibility 633 0.5637 0.2133 417 0.6444 0.1962 115 0.5370 0.1797 190 0.5829 0.1353 
Tax Effects 628 −0.7088 1.1245 403 0.0891 0.3397 115 0.1540 0.4990 186 0.0858 0.1412 
 
Countries Poland Romania Russia Eastern Europe 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Size 1443 9.1656 8.7902 473 15.0243 5.4213 1325 8.8765 9.3132 5631 9.7159 8.6823 
Growth Opportunities 757 0.5502 0.0907 421 0.0095 0.0312 655 0.0309 0.1116 3188 0.0257 0.0750 
Profitability 758 0.0630 0.1190 421 0.1117 0.1317 655 0.0915 0.1952 3189 0.1072 2.5387 
Business Risk 750 11.0998 181.9291 421 22.0645 181.7592 654 2.9837 158.3979 3157 15.2124 507.4524
Liquidity 746 1.7289 1.9473 421 1.6851 1.2560 655 1.7785 2.2589 3174 2.0640 2.8004 
Tangibility 758 0.4416 0.2056 421 0.5459 0.1578 655 0.5501 0.2012 3189 0.5403 0.2002 
Tax Effects 750 0.1595 2.3871 421 0.2524 0.2372 654 1.0830 19.0344 3157 0.1769 12.0275
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Table 5. Correlation matrices. (a) The sample consists of 13,490 firm-year observations from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Co- 
lombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (Economatica Pro database, 2003) over the period 1990-2002; (b) The sample consists of 
7919 firm-year observations from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia (Amadeus da- 
tabase, 2004) over the period 1994-2003. 
Panel (a) Latin America 
 Size Growth Opportunities Profitability Business Risk Liquidity Tangibility Tax Effects 
Size 1.0000       
Growth Opportunities 0.0696 1.0000      
Profitability 0.2085 0.0233 1.0000     
Business Risk 0.0116 −0.0016 0.0110 1.0000    
Liquidity −0.0060 −0.0243 −0.0177 −0.1498 1.0000   
Tangibility 0.1652 0.0568 0.1169 0.0070 −0.0505 1.0000  
Tax Effects −0.0200 −0.0008 0.0039 −0.0028 0.0003 −0.0028 1.0000 
Panel (b) Eastern Europe 
 Size Growth Opportunities Profitability Business Risk Liquidity Tangibility Tax Effects 
Size 1.0000       
Growth Opportunities 0.0937 1.0000      
Profitability 0.0312 0.0642 1.0000     
Business Risk 0.0024 −0.0221 −0.0003 1.0000    
Liquidity −0.1053 0.0164 0.0554 −0.0089 1.0000   
Tangibility −0.0166 −0.1819 0.0028 −0.0138 −0.0602 1.0000  
Tax Effects 0.0293 −0.0040 0.0005 −0.0017 0.0122 −0.0330 1.0000 
 
tors of the dependent (endogenous) variables ((the ith- 
firm leverage and maturity ratios on the tth-period), , ,i k t  
is the matrix of K firm-specific independent (explanatory) 
variables (including industry dummies in the simple 
pooling and random-effects models), , ,i l t
Y
Z  is the matrix 
of L country dummies (in the simple pooling and ran- 
dom-effects models), 0,i  is the firm-specific intercept 
in the fixed-effects model, 0,t  is the period-specific 
intercept, 1,k  and 2,l  are the matrices of coefficients, 
i  is the firm-specific error term in the random-effects 
model, and ,i t  is a vector of error terms. Due to the 
nature of the data (panel data) we test the model for fixed 
and random effects. Once it is established that the fixed- 
effects model provides a good fit for the model then the 
lagged endogenous variable is added to Equation (1), 
which is then first-differenced yielding the dynamic sys- 
tem below: 
, 0 , 1 1, , ,
1
ΔLeverage ΔLeverage Δki t i i t k i k t i t
k
Y ,   

  
,
 
(Equation (2)) 
, 0 , 1 1, , ,
1
ΔMaturity ΔMaturity Δ
k
i t i i t k i k t i t
k
Y   

    
One advantage of this specification is that the rate of 
adjustment of the firm towards its optimal capital struc- 
ture and maturity (assuming that the optimal capital and 
maturity structures are determined by the exogenous 
variables , , ) can be estimated as Δ i k tY  01 i    . If 
adjustment costs are high, the rate of adjustment is ex- 
pected to all (be sm  approaching ze very  
n
ro), while a 
high rate of adjustme t (   approaching one) suggests 
the presence of negligible a justment costs. d
4.2. Preliminary Specification Tests 
model (simple 
5. Results 
c Panel Data Estimation Results 
tion 
Our analysis starts to determine which 
polling, fixed-effects, or random-effects) is more appro- 
priate to the sample data. We perform two independent 
specification tests: The F-test of Simple Pooling versus 
Fixed-effects model and the Hausman test of random- 
effects versus fixed effects. The results are shown in Ta- 
ble 6 (Panels (a) and (b)). The results (Panel (a)) strong- 
ly reject the single intercept hypothesis, both for the 
LA-7 and for the EE-7. In panel (b) the Hausman speci- 
fication test is performed to test which model of variable 
intercepts across firms better fits the data. This test is 
particularly appropriated in situations wher N (the num- 
ber of cross-sectional units) is large relative to T (the 
number of time periods) which is precisely the case of 
our sample. The test rejects the random-effects specifica- 
tion for the leverage equation in the LA-7 and the matur- 
ity equation for the EE-7. However, for the remaining 
cases it cannot reject such specification for both groups 
of countries. 
5.1. Dynami
Preliminary runs of the fixed-effects model of Equa
(1) revealed a substantial presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. This finding raises the question that the 
maturity choice of the firm may be dynamic, i.e., current  
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Table 6. Specification tests. (a) This test statistic is for test- maturity may depend on past mat  exp o- 
dels such possibility, and suggeing the null hypothesis that firms’ intercept in the basic 
fixed-effects panel data model are all equal, against the al- 
ternative hypothesis that each firm has its own (distinct 
intercept). The test assumes identical slopes for all inde- 
pendent variables across all firms, and it is distributed F(df1, 
df2). “All” refers to the pooling together of all firm-level 
data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Russia. “LA-7” refers to the polling 
together of all firm-level data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela while “EE-7” refers to 
the polling of firm-level data for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. The data 
covers the period 1990-2003. Endogenous variables are: 
Leverage is equal to long-term book liabilities divided by 
book value of equity and Maturity is equal to long term debt 
divided by total debt. P-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* represents significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; (b) 
This test statistic is for testing the null hypothesis of the 
random-effects specification against the alternative hypo- 
thesis of the fixed-effects specification in the basic panel 
data model, and it is distributed Χ2 (df). “All” refers to the 
pooling together of all firm-level data for Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. 
“LA-7” refers to the polling together of all firm-level data 
for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Vene-
zuela while “EE-7” refers to the polling of firm-level data 
for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Russia. The data covers the period 1990-2003. 
Endogenous variables are: Leverage is equal to long-term 
book liabilities divided by book value of equity and Maturity 
is equal to long term debt divided by total debt. P-values are 
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
Panel (a) F-Test of a Simple pooled OLS against a Fixed Effects Spe- 
  Period  Leverage  Maturity 
cification 
Region
ALL  1990-2003 
F ( ) F ( 7)1205; 5637
2.7088*** 
(0.000) 
1205; 563
4.9346*** 
(0.000) 
LA-7  1990-2002 
F ( 8) F(  
EE-7  1994-2003 
F ( 6) F ( 6)
714; 390
2.0101*** 
(0.000) 
714; 3908)
4.9446 
(0.000) 
490; 169
2.4474*** 
(0.000) 
490; 169
3.5822*** 
(0.000) 
Panel (b) Hausman Specification Test of -effects against Fixed- 
Period  Leverage  Maturity 
 Random
effects Specification 
Region 
ALL  1990-2003 
Χ2 (6) 
11.170* 
(0.083) 
Χ2 (11) 
14.230 
(0.221) 
LA-7  1990-2002  10 * 
EE-7  1994-2003  1.985 
(0.3706) 
45.418*** 
(0.000) 
Χ2 (4) 
1.960**
(0.000) 
Χ2 (13) 
16.864* 
(0.221) 
Χ2 (2) Χ2 (10) 
urity. [22] licitly m
st that a dynamic rather 
than static panel data analysis  adequ w- 
ever, the usual OLS and GLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent when the lagged dependent variable is in- 
cluded in the right-hand side of the panel data model11. In 
order to overcome this problem, GMM estimation is used 
instead. Therefore, Equation (2) is estimated by General- 
ized Method of Moments (GMM) using as instruments 
first-order lagged values of the levels of explanatory varia- 
bles, sector dummies, country dummies, and a constant. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust according to 
the method proposed by [49] and are also robust to auto- 
correlation. Table 7 reports the results for all countries 
pooled together and Table 8 for each region separately12. 
One major result is that maturity equations perform 
slightly better than the leverage ones. When all countries 
are polled together (in Table 7) the dummy variable us d
may be ate. Ho
e  
to signal the difference between the two regions, becomes 
significant for the leverage equation but not for the ma- 
turity one. This result indicates that the level of debt is 
different between the two samples. Another interesting 
result is that it is easier for the firm to change the matur- 
ity of its debt than to adjust its leverage ratio. At the 
same time, adjustment to the target maturity is by no 
means costless and instantaneous. The estimated rate of 
adjustment to an optimal capital structure ranges between 
0.55 and 0.64 an indication that firms in the sample face 
moderate adjustment costs, being these adjustments costs 
in general higher for capital structure than for debt ma- 
turity, and this is a pattern between the LA-7 and the 
EE-7 samples. The cross-effects between leverage and 
maturity behave exactly the opposite between the LA-7 
and the EE-7 (Table 8). While maturity has a significant 
positive contemporaneous effect on leverage (and vice 
versa) for the LA-7, it has a significant negative effect in 
the EE-7. This finding indicates that these policy vari- 
ables are complements in Latin America and substitutes 
in Eastern Europe. One possible explanation for this dif- 
ference in results for each group of countries is their par- 
ticular institutional and economic environments differ- 
ences for the period of the analysis. Latin America stock 
markets seem more developed (trade more companies and 
have larger market capitalization than their counterparts 
in Eastern Europe) and therefore Latin American firms 
obtained a financial advantage that allows them use fi- 
nancing alternatives in their favour, reinforcing each other. 
Regarding the explanatory variables, it is worth to un- 
derscore that the two variables pointed out by [27] as the  
11See [45-48] for further discussion. 
12One important issue when estimating via GMM is to make sure that 
the instrument set is adequate. We report in Tables 7 and 8 the Sar-
gan’s test statistic for the null hypothesis that moment restrictions are 
orthogonal. 
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ntries. First-differences model so that idiosyncratic firm-effects 
of pl a  v
 
Table 7. Panel data analysis of maturity ratios for Pooled Cou
constant through time are eliminated. The following model are estimated ΔLeveragei,t = β0,1ΔLeveragei,t−1 +
1k
 β1,kΔY1,k,t + εi,t 
and ΔMaturityi,t = β0,1ΔMaturityi,t−1 +
k β1,kΔY1,k,t + εi,t by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using as instruments first 
order lagged values of the levels  ex an tory ariables, industry and country dummies and constant. Estimation period is 
from 1990 to 2003. The sample refers to the polling together of all firm-level data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. Dependent variables 
are Leverage equal to long-term book liabilities divided by book value of equity and Maturity is equal to Long-term debt di- 
vided by total debt. Reported t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White) and are also 
robust for autocorrelation (Bartlett Kernel); t-statistics in parenthesis and ***, ** and * represents significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. 
Variables Leverage Maturity 
k
1k
∆Leveraget  0.0062(0.7951) 
∆Maturityt 1.2 5)  
 0.4646  
 −  0.3262  
−  
∆Growth Opportunitiest 
∆ t 
−  0  
−  
Re y 
Latin my 0  
N s 
Sargan Χ2 (df) (38.808    0.969         (57) 
707(1.358
** .3833)∆Leveraget−1 (2 0.0010(0.2540) 
*** 9.6831)∆Maturityt−1 0.6379(−1.4060) (
∆Sizet −0.0191(−0.2080) 0.0123(−1.4663)
0.1767(1.5220) 0.0038(0.1622) 
Profitability 0.1898(0.1895) 0.1379(.3297) 
∆Business Riskt 0.0000(0.0791) 0.0000(−1.7631) 
∆Liquidityt 0.0231(−0.4335) .0169**(1.9758)
∆Tangibilityt 1.0902(0.6615) −0.0544(−0.2651) 
∆TaxEffectst 0.0001(1.2487) 
−  
0.0001***(−3.8930)
gulation Dumm 0.0229(−0.6052) 0.0021(0.2518) 
 America Dum .0919***(2.9976) −0.0039(−0.6183) 
umber of Observation
F-statistic 
F(df1; df2) 
’s Test alue) 
4436 
0.1570 
(1  1; 4424)
4436 
***3.0127  
(1 ) 1; 4424
Statistic (p-v 2)     
 
Table 8. tios for Latin A ifferences model so that idio- 
syncratic firm-effects constant through time are eliminated. The following model are estimated ΔLeveragei,t = 
 Panel data analysis of maturity ra merica and Eastern Europe. First-d
β0,1ΔLeveragei,t−1 +
1
k
k
 β1,kΔY1,k,t + εi,t and ΔMaturityi,t = β0,1ΔMaturityi,t−1 +
1
k
k
 β1,kΔY1,k,t + εi,t by Generalized Method of Mo- 
m nts (GMM) ments first order lagged values of the vels planatory variables, industry and country 
dummies and constant. Estimation period is from 1990 to 2003. “Latin merica” refers to the pooling together of all 
firm-level data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. “Eastern Europe” refers to the polling 
together of all firm-level data for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia. The sample 
refers to the polling together of all firm-level data for,. Dependent variables are Leverage equal to long-term book liabilities 
divided by book value of equity and Maturity is equal to Long-term debt divided by total debt. Reported t-statistics are cal- 
culated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White) and are also robust for autocorrelation (Bartlett Kernel); 
t-statistics in parenthesis and ***, ** and * represents significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 Latin America Eastern Europe 
e  using as instru le  of ex
A
Variables Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity 
∆Leveraget  0.0262***(6.9861)  9***(−11.0160)−0.410
∆Maturityt 15.8 −1.91
 0.3281(   
 
∆Growth Opportunitiest 
∆ t
 − ) − ) 
−  
Re y 
Numb tions 
Sargan’s Test Statistic (p-value) Χ2 (df) 26.7493    (0.986)      (45) 21.9077    (0.998)     (44) 
237***(8.94
.2109)
50)  81***(−16.9
** .2236)
139)  
∆Leveraget−1 1 −0.0039(−0.6735) 0.4543
*** 8.8230) 
(2 0.2067 (2.0843) 
0.3629*** 5.6040) 
**
∆Maturityt−1 −5.8078***(−6.0183) 0.3679
**
(
**
0.6808***(5.5210) (
∆Sizet 2.0609 (2.5093) −0.1089* (−2.6423) −0.0114(−1.1196) −0.0057(−0.9155) 
0.3043(0.7780) −0.0153(−0.6760) 0.3296(0.4204) 0.2233(0.7125) 
Profitability  −1.2305(−0.3338) 0.1477(0.8179) 0.1597(0.9369) 
0  
0.0627(0.6947) 
0  ∆Business Riskt 0.0005(1.3408) 
***
0.0000(−1.5770) 
0 ***  
.0000(−0.1483)
**
.0000(−0.2950)
**∆Liquidityt −0.5759 (−3.1660)
− ) 
.0329 (2.5854) 0.0668 (−2.4803 0.0383 (−2.3800
∆Tangibilityt 
∆  
5.6540(−1.3894
***
0.2333(1.1477) 
***
0.6023(1.0268) 
***
0.3167(1.0093) 
**TaxEffectst 0.0015 (3.5933) 0.0001 (−3.9366) 0.0080 (1.9943) 
−  
0.0038 (2.3653) 
−  gulation Dumm −0.0238(−0.1707) 0.0018(0.2446) 0.0163(−0.5778) 0.0086(−0.5024)
er of Observa
F-statistic 
F(df1; df2) 
3305 
0.1145 
(10; 3294) 
3305 
***2.7712  
(10; 3294) 
1131 
1.1492 
(10; 1120) 
1131 
***2.3916  
(10; 1120) 
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major th  of the joint dec Growth 
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[3] H. DeAngelo and R. W. Masulis, “Optimal Capital Struc- 
ture under Co xation,” Journal of 
Financial Eco 80, pp. 3-29.  
eoretical determinants ision, 
 and the y, are not
tcant in any equation and sample
und significant in Latin America, but 
ionally, Size is 
n Eastern fo
Europe; Liquidity is significant in both samples and for 
all equations, being in general positive (more liquid firms 
choose less and shorter debt); Tax Effects are also sig- 
nificant and positive (except for the leverage equation of 
the EE-7), indicating that more heavily taxed firms choose 
a higher level of indebtedness and longer maturity. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analyses 
One question that emerges from the cross-country ap- 
proach chosen in this paper is whether a single country 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(80)90019-7
may be driving the results. In
stness of the findings, we a
analysis approach. We therefore re-estimate Equation (2) 
by dropping all observations of a given country at a time. 
We also check for the influence of any single year over 
the results by dropping all observations of a given year at 
a time and that of a single industry by dropping all firms 
of an industry at a time. Results of these sensitivity analy- 
ses support the robustness of the previous findings. The 
average coefficients for independent variables are similar 
to the results reported above, and so are the t-statistics. In 
particular, the significance is in general confirmed in the 
[50] histograms for those variables that are significant in 
the whole sample analysis presented in Table 8 (lagged 
leverage and lagged maturity, contemporaneous leverage 
and maturity, size, liquidity, and tax effects). 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the choice between debt and eq- 
uity simultaneously with the decision between t-and 
rkets 
 
long-term debt for 
from Latin America and Ea
by using a unique sample of 986 firms and 13,490 firm- 
year observations from Latin America and 686 firms and 
7919 firm-year observations from Eastern Europe for the 
period 1990-2003. The paper sets out to address three 
research questions: are capital structure and debt maturity 
decisions taken simultaneously? Secondly, is there a dy- 
namic component in the determination of the optimal 
capital structure and debt maturity? Thirdly, are adjust- 
ments costs towards optimal capital structure and debt 
maturity important? 
The empirical results support three main findings: first, 
the cross-effects between leverage and maturity behave 
exactly the opposite between Latin America and Eastern 
Europe sub-samples.  
e policy complements in Latin America and substitutes 
in Eastern Europe; secondly, there is a significant dyna- 
mic effects component in the determination of leverage 
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